SC slams Punjab HC for presumptuous conclusions in dowry case

New Delhi, Feb 1 (PTI) The Supreme Court today slammed the Punjab and Haryana High Court for making presumptuous conclusions in a dowry case that a complainant's in-laws could act cruelly against their daughter-in-law. A bench of Justices Arijit Pasayat and P Sathasivam while quashing a dowry case registered against the complainant's in-laws found fault with the high court for such presumptuous conclusion without giving any valid explanation for the same. "Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him," the apex court said.The bench said the high court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind. In this case Ran Singh, father-in-law of Saroj, had challenged a Punjab High Court order justifying registration of dowry cases against him and his wife Rajbala.The high court had held that the cases were maintainable despite the fact that the sessions court had ruled that no cases could be made out against the in-laws as according to it an effort was made to implicate all the family members by Saroj.The sessions court discharged the complainant's in-laws and brother-in-law Jai Singh and sister-in-law Suman, while retaining the charges only against Saroj's husband Jaswant.
Source:-Outlook India


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Supreme court Judgement
CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 222 of 2008PETITIONER:
Ran Singh and Anr.RESPONDENT:
State of Haryana and Anr.DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/01/2008BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & P. SATHASIVAMJUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.3089 of 2006)Judis link: http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.aspx?filename=30196
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a
learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
allowing the Revision Petition filed under Section 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') which
was filed before it by Kurra Ram since deceased and
represented by his daughter i.e. respondent No.2 in the
present appeal.3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: A complaint was filed by the aforesaid Kurra Ram
alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections
498-A, 406, 323, 506, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (in short the 'IPC') by Jaswant-son in law and husband
of his daughter-Saroj, Ran Singh and Raj Bala, the present
appellants who were father and mother of Jaswant and two
others namely, Jai Singh and Suman, the brother and married
sister of Jaswant.

It was stated in the complaint that Saroj got married to
Jaswant on 14.4.1994 and that she was harassed for dowry by
the aforesaid accused persons. Learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Hissar, after recording preliminary
evidence of the complainant, decided to proceed against all the
accused persons for the alleged offences. Separate Revision
Petitions were filed by Jai Singh, Ran Singh and Suman taking
the stand that there is no offence made out so far as they are
concerned. Learned Additional Sessions Judge found that no
case was made out against aforesaid accused persons and
directed that proceedings would continue only against
Jaswant. The order dated 4.11.2003 disposing of the revisions
in the aforesaid manner was challenged by Kurra Ram in the
Revision Petition before the High Court. It was held by High
Court that there is no ground to proceed against Jai Singh and
Suman who may just be living in the house, but may not be
interfering in matrimonial problems of Saroj and Jaswant.
Therefore, the order of the Additional Sessions Judge was
upheld to that extent. But so far as the present appellants are
concerned the High Court inter alia observed as follows:

"However, when articles of dowry are handed
over to elder members in the family that will
mean that those were handed over to Ran
Singh and Raj Bala i.e. father and mother of
the husband who could misappropriate. It is
they who can practice cruelty for less dowry or
otherwise."

(Underlined for emphasis)

The High Court noted that police had earlier registered a
case and had sent cancellation report and thereafter the
complaint was filed by Kurra Ram who appeared as PW-1, as
his son Rajesh appeared as PW-2 and Saroj as PW-3.

4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
High Court failed to notice that some customary articles were
given to relatives of the bridegroom. That cannot be covered by
the expression 'dowry'. High Court noticed the fact that the
complainant tried to rope even a married sister who was living
far away and the brother, which shows the tendency to falsely
implicate them. Reference is also made to the following
observations of the High Court:

"..They are close relatives but the fact remains
that an effort is made by the complainant to
implicate as many persons as possible, in such
matters."
5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State and the
complainant submitted that it is not a case where the
Additional Sessions Judge should have interfered and the High
Court has therefore rightly set aside the order dated 4.11.2003
which was impugned before it.

6. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short
'Dowry Act') defines "dowry" as under:-

Section 2. Definition of 'dowry'  In this Act,
'dowry' means any property or valuable
security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly 
(a) by one party to a marriage to the
other party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a
marriage or by any other person, to
either party to the marriage or to any
other person,

at or before or any time after the marriage in
connection with the marriage of the said
parties, but does not include dower or mehr
in the case of persons to whom the Muslim
personal law (Shariat) applies.

Explanation I- For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby declared that any presents made at
the time of a marriage to either party to the
marriage in the form of cash, ornaments,
clothes or other articles, shall not be deemed
to be dowry within the meaning of this
section, unless they are made as
consideration for the marriage of the said
parties.

Explanation II- The expression 'valuable
security' has the same meaning in Section 30
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
7. The word "dowry" is defined in Section 2 of the Dowry
Act. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is
before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the
third "at any time" after the marriage. The third occasion may
appear to be unending period. But the crucial words are "in
connection with the marriage of the said parties". Other
payments which are customary payments e.g. given at the
time of birth of a child or other ceremonies as are prevalent in
different societies are not covered by the expression "dowry".
(See Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001 (8) SCC 633))
.

8. The High Court has fallen in grave error while observing
that present appellants "could misappropriate" and "who can
practice cruelty". The conclusions to say the least are
presumptuous. Learned Additional Sessions Judge by a well
reasoned order had held that there was no material to show
that demand for any dowry was made and an attempt was
made to rope in many persons. When the High Court was
interfering with such conclusions arrived at on facts it ought
to have indicated the reasons necessitating such interference.
That has not been done and on the contrary on presumptuous
conclusions the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge
has been set aside.

9. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest
consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth
its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an
application of its mind. The absence of reasons has rendered
the High Court's judgment not sustainable.

10. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning
M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1) All
E.R. 1148) observed "The giving of reasons is one of the
fundamentals of good administration". In Alexander Machinery
(Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was observed:
"Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons
are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the
controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived
at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The
emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals
the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence,
render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their
appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in
adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an
indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least
sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter
before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can
know why the decision has gone against him. One of the
salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons
for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The
"inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a
judicial or quasi-judicial performance.

11. It is to be noted that the High Court itself has held that
there was an attempt to rope in many persons and it did not
find any merit or challenge to the discharge of the married
sister and the brother.

12. Above being the position, the impugned order of the High
Court cannot be maintained and is set aside. We make it clear
that we have not expressed any opinion on merits so far as
husband Jaswant is concerned.

13. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

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Conviction can be based only on victim's dying declaration: SC

New Delhi, Jan 30 (PTI) The Supreme Court has ruled that a person can be convicted on the sole basis of a victim's dying declaration if it is found to be reliable.

"If a dying declaration is found to be reliable then there is no need for corroboration by any witness and conviction can be sustained on its basis alone," a bench of Justices Arijit Pasayat and P Satasivan said while relying on various earlier ruling of the apex court.

The bench dismissed the appeal filed by Bijoy Das challenging the life sentence imposed by a sessions courts in West Bengal for allegedly shooting down his nephew due to previous enmity which was affirmed by the Calcutta High Court.

Bijoy Das in his appeal claimed that the dying declaration was unreliable and no reliance can be placed on the witnesses cited by the prosecution.

Disagreeing with the argument the apex court said it found no reason to doubt the veracity of the dying declaration of the victim which was consistent through out.

"We see no reason why the doctor or the other witnesses should make a false statement about the dying declaration. There is no allegation of enmity between accused and these person," the bench said.

Recalling an earlier observation, the apex court said a dying declaration made by a person on the verge of his death has special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person most unlikely to make untrue statement.

But at the same time the dying declaration, like any other evidence, has to be tested on the touchstone of credibility to be acceptable. News source

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Supreme Court Judgement
CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 188 of 2008

PETITIONER:
Bijoy Das

RESPONDENT:
State of West Bengal

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/01/2008

BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & P. SATHASIVAM

JUDGMENT:Click here
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5632 of 2006)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a
Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, upholding the
conviction and sentence of the appellant who was found guilty
of offence punishable under Sections 302 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (in short IPC) and was sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life.
3. Prosecution case in a nutshell is as follows:

On 28.9.1993, between 6.45 p.m. and 7.00 p.m. Sisir Kr.
Das @ Ajoy (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) was shot
by the present appellant in front of his house at College Para
and immediately thereafter Ajoy was shifted to hospital where
after ten days he succumbed to his injuries. One Satya Ranjan
Das (PW 1), cousin brother of Ajoy, getting information from
one local boy about the occurrence, came to learn from injured
Ajoy at hospital that he was shot at by his step uncle Bijoy
Das. The appellant immediately thereafter lodged the written
complaint at Raijung P.S.

On the basis of the written complaint of Satya Ranjan
Das which was received by the local P.S. at about 19.50 hours
of 28.9.1993 S.I. S. Pradhan of Raijung P.S. took up the
investigation and in course of investigation, he visited the
place of occurrence, made seizure in respect of a bicycle used
by the victim Ajoy, visited hospital and recorded statement of
Ajoy and other witnesses of the occurrence, collected
declaration given by Ajoy to the attending doctor and S.I.
Pradhan also collected the post mortem report and finally,
submitted charge sheet against the present appellant both
under Section 302 IPC as well as under Section 25/27 of the
Arms Act, 1959 (in short Arms Act). The learned Sessions
Judge after framing charge under Section 302 IPC as well as
under Section 25/27 of the Arms Act explained the same to
the appellant and the appellant pleaded not guilty to both the
charges and claimed for trial.

Prosecution, during trial examined 16 witnesses
including PW.1 the FIR maker, PW.4 wife of the deceased who
was an eyewitness of the occurrence and PW.6, PW.8 and
PW.9. who came to learn from deceased Ajoy that he was shot
at by the appellant. Prosecution also examined PW.14 doctor
Jiban Krishana Bhaduri who conducted operation of Ajoy and
who also recorded a declaration of Ajoy disclosing the name of
the appellant as his assailant, PW.15 Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh,
conducted post-mortem examination and PW.16 was the
investigating officer. Apart from oral evidence, prosecution
also produced before the Trial Court the written complaint of
PW.1, bed head ticket of Ajoy Das consisting declaration of
Ajoy recorded by PW.14, post-mortem report and several
seizure lists.

The learned Trial Court, on perusal of prosecution
evidence both oral and documentary and after considering
submissions of both the sides, found the present appellant
guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC and he was
convicted accordingly. However, the Trial Court did not find
any material to hold the appellant guilty for the offence under
Section 25/27 of the Arms Act.

4. The Trial Court placed reliance on the evidence of PW4
the wife of the victim and also relied on the evidence of PWs 6,
8 and 9 along with PW1. It is to be noted that the deceased
during his treatment in the hospital had categorically stated
that the appellant has assaulted him. The Trial Court did not
find any substance in the plea that at the behest of PW1 the
false case has been foisted.
5. In appeal the High Court, as noted above, dismissed the
appeal.

6. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the evidence of PW4 clearly lacks credence.
The alleged statement before PWs 6, 8, 9 and 14 cannot be
treated as a dying declaration. Learned counsel of the
respondent-State on the other hand supported the judgment

7. We see no reason to doubt the veracity of the dying
declarations especially since there is consistency between
them. We see no reason why the doctor or the other witnesses
should make a false statement about the dying declaration.
There is no allegation of enmity between the accused and
these persons.

As observed by this Court in Narain Singh v. State of
Haryana AIR vide para 7: (SCC p. 267, para 7)

A dying declaration made by a person on the
verge of his death has a special sanctity as at
that solemn moment a person is most unlikely
to make any untrue statement. The shadow of
impending death is by itself guarantee of the
truth of the statement of the deceased
regarding the circumstances leading to his
death. But at the same time the dying
declaration like any other evidence has to be
tested on the touchstone of credibility to be
acceptable. It is more so, as the accused does
not get an opportunity of questioning veracity
of the statement by cross-examination. The
dying declaration if found reliable can form the
base of conviction.

8. In Babulal v. State of M.P. (2003 (12) SCC 490) this Court
observed vide in para 7 of the said decision as under: (SCC p.
494)
A person who is facing imminent death, with
even a shadow of continuing in this world
practically non-existent, every motive of
falsehood is obliterated. The mind gets altered
by most powerful ethical reasons to speak only
the truth. Great solemnity and sanctity is
attached to the words of a dying person
because a person on the verge of death is not
likely to tell lies or to concoct a case so as to
implicate an innocent person. The maxim is a
man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his
mouth (nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri).
Mathew Arnold said, truth sits on the lips of a
dying man. The general principle on which the
species of evidence is admitted is that they are
declarations made in extremity, when the
party is at the point of death, and when every
hope of this world is gone, when every motive
to falsehood is silenced and mind induced by
the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth; situation so solemn that law considers
the same as creating an obligation equal to
that which is imposed by a positive oath
administered in a court of justice.

9. In Ravi v. State of T.N. ((2004 (10) SCC 776) this Court
observed that: (SCC p. 777, para 3)
If the truthfulness of the dying declaration
cannot be doubted, the same alone can form
the basis of conviction of an accused and the
same does not require any corroboration,
whatsoever, in law.

10. In Muthu Kutty v. State (2005 (9) SCC 113) vide para 15
this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 120-21)
15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to
great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the
accused has no power of cross-examination.
Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth
as an obligation of oath could be. This is the
reason the court also insists that the dying
declaration should be of such a nature as to
inspire full confidence of the court in its
correctness. The court has to be on guard that
the statement of the deceased was not as a
result of either tutoring, or prompting or a
product of imagination. The court must be
further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit
state of mind after a clear opportunity to
observe and identify the assailant. Once the
court is satisfied that the declaration was true
and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its
conviction without any further corroboration. It
cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law
that the dying declaration cannot form the sole
basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The
rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of
prudence. This Court has laid down in several
judgments the principles governing dying
declaration, which could be summed up as
under as indicated in Paniben v. State of
Gujarat (1992 (2) SCC 474) : (SCC pp. 480-81,
paras 18-19) (emphasis supplied)
(i ) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence
that dying declaration cannot be acted upon
without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v.
State of M.P. (1976 (3) SCC 104)

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying
declaration is true and voluntary it can base
conviction on it, without corroboration. (See
State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav and
Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1985 (1) SCC
552)
(iii) The court has to scrutinise the dying
declaration carefully and must ensure that the
declaration is not the result of tutoring,
prompting or imagination. The deceased had
an opportunity to observe and identify the
assailants and was in a fit state to make the
declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v.
Public Prosecutor (1976 (3) SCC 618)

(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it
should not be acted upon without
corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v.
State of M.P. (1974 (4) SCC 264)
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and
could never make any dying declaration the
evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See
Kake Singh v. State of M.P.(1981Supp. SCC 25)

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from
infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction.
(See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P.(1981 (2)
SCC 654)

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does
not contain the details as to the occurrence, it
is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra
v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu (1980 Supp.
SCC 455)

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief
statement, it is not to be discarded. On the
contrary, the shortness of the statement itself
guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State
of Bihar (1980 Supp. SCC 769))
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy
whether deceased was in a fit mental condition
to make the dying declaration look up to the
medical opinion. But where the eyewitness
said that the deceased was in a fit and
conscious state to make the dying declaration,
the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See
Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. (1988 Supp. SCC
152)

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from
the version as given in the dying declaration,
the said declaration cannot be acted upon.
(See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (1989 (3)
SCC 390 )

(xi) Where there are more than one statement
in the nature of dying declaration, one first in
point of time must be preferred. Of course, if
the plurality of dying declaration could be held
to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be
accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v.
State of Maharashtra (1982 (1) SCC 700)

11. A perusal of the various decisions of this Court, some of
which have been referred to above, shows that if a dying
declaration is found to be reliable then there is no need for
corroboration by any witness, and conviction can be sustained
on its basis alone.
12. The evidence of PWs. 6, 8 and 9 clearly shows that the
deceased immediately prior to his death had disclosed to PWs.
6, 8 and 9 that he had suffered injuries at the hands of the
appellant. Additionally, in the bed-head ticket which was
exhibited, PW-14 categorically noted the statement of the
deceased that he had been assaulted by the accused. The
evidence of PW4 was to the effect that she was waiting for her
husband standing in front of their house. She stated that the
deceased was coming by a bicycle. She also could note that
the appellant as following the deceased and fired shot at the
deceased. When the evidence of PWs 4, 6, 8, and 9 is
analyzed, the inevitable conclusion, as was rightly observed by
the Trial Court and the High Court, is that the appellant had
fired the shot which resulted in the death of the deceased.

13. That being so, there is no merit in this appeal and the
same is dismissed.